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Abstract 
The opening of the Fairview Terminal in September, 2007 was an 
important landmark in the one hundred year history of Prince Rupert Port 
development.  Despite the initial vision and plans of Charles Hays, a later 
boom provided by American troops during World War II, and another 
spike in development in the late 1970s, Prince Rupert has yet to fulfill its 
early promise as a gateway to the East.  The recent emergence of 
container shipping and the construction of a new deep water container 
port is the latest in a series of efforts to fulfill that promise.  Throughout its 
history, the port in Prince Rupert has been shaped and hindered by 
external political and economic forces, dependent on support from 
outside investors and government officials with little commitment to the 
local community.  This paper examines these factors across time to 
illustrate specific dynamics that are critical components of contemporary 
development, and highlights the contributions and benefits of what has 
been termed elsewhere “networked federalism.”  Such a concept 
highlights the influence of multi-level governance, both vertical and 
horizontal, on public policy and development.  The paper begins with a 
review of Rupert port development in the past, then turns to the present, 
and concludes with some comparisons intended to highlight prospects for 
the future, both in Rupert and in multi-level governance. 
Introduction2 
The opening of the Fairview Terminal in September, 2007 was an important landmark in 
the one hundred year history of Prince Rupert Port development.  Despite the initial 
vision and plans of Charles Hays, a later boom provided by American troops during 
World War II, and another spike in development in the late 1970s, Prince Rupert has yet 
to fulfill its early promise as a gateway to the East.  The recent emergence of container 
shipping and the construction of a new deep water container port is the latest in a series 
of efforts to fulfill that promise.  Throughout its history, the port in Prince Rupert has 
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been shaped and hindered by external political and economic forces, dependent on 
support from outside investors and government officials with little commitment to the 
local community.  This paper examines these factors across time to illustrate specific 
dynamics that are critical components of contemporary development, and highlights the 
contributions and benefits of what has been termed elsewhere “network federalism.”i  
Such a concept highlights the influence of multi-level governance, both vertical and 
horizontal, on public policy and development.  The paper begins with a review of Rupert 
port development in the past, then turns to the present, and concludes with some 
comparisons intended to highlight prospects for the future, both in Rupert and in multi-
level governance. 
Incorporated in 1910, Prince Rupert was an integral part of the corporate strategy of the 
Grand Trunk Pacific Railway to construct a second national railway and develop a new 
western port that would rival Vancouver.ii  The Federal Government was behind part of 
this strategy, although the decision to construct a terminus in Rupert was made by 
general manager Charles Hays.  He promised a future city of 50,000 that would be the 
main link to China and the East, noting that Rupert was a good five hundred miles closer 
to the Far East than other ports on the West Coast.  As the Grand Trunk advertised in 
1909, 
To this port will come ships of the Seven Seas.  Ships of the east, laden 
with silk and rice will soon be riding at anchor in this splendid harbour, to 
sail away laden with lumber;  ships for the West with wares of the west; 
ships from the shores of far off continents trading through the new and 
picturesque port of Prince Rupert.iii 
The Grand Trunk Pacific Railway was completed after nine years, in 1914, just months 
before the outbreak of World War I, and two years after Mr. Hays perished with the 
sinking of the Titanic.  The Grand Trunk Railway, however, faced mounting debt costs 
and diminished traffic as a result of the war, and soon defaulted in 1919.   
Despite such a stuttering start, Prince Rupert became a commercial fishing centre, with 
as many as 23 canneries in the area.  In time, it also developed a ship building industry, 
and became home to government agencies.  By the 1930s, the small city had a 
population of some 6,000 people.iv 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 fueled fears that future attacks on the 
West Coast might lead to a Japanese base in North America, and Prince Rupert was 
identified as a potential target.  American troops took advantage of the railway terminus 
and the deep water port, and Rupert’s wartime population quickly surged to 23,000, with 
3,380 American troops at their peak.  Some 74,000 American military and civilian 
personnel used Rupert as the point of departure for Alaska during the war.  Additionally, 
the Rupert shipbuilding industry built four minesweepers and fifteen freighters during the 
war years.  With peace, however, the flurry of activity subsided.  The population settled 
back to 8,000, and by the 1950s, the shipyards had been dismantled.   
Today, Rupert has a population under 13,000, and it is reasonable to conclude that the 
early vision of Charles Hays remains unfulfilled.  The decades since the war have 
witnessed the boom and bust of forestry and pulp mills, as well as coal and grain exports 
through new port terminals.  Prior to this most recent round of investment and port 
expansion, the Rupert Port has largely been an overload port to help relieve congestion 
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in Vancouver.  It has yet to emerge as a priority port for either export or import.  Why this 
is so is part of the story of the Prince Rupert Port. There are at least five factors that 
have inhibited development and growth: competition with Vancouver; the role of the 
Federal government; the role of the provincial government of British Columbia; corporate 
interests; and limited influence of local government.  Each of these factors is addressed 
in turn.  
Vancouver Port development has consistently eclipsed any development in Prince 
Rupert, especially during the decades following World War II.  Despite the rail 
connections to Rupert, Vancouver remained the port of preference for Western Canada.  
The choice was hardly controversial: goods travelling through Edmonton or Calgary 
were directed to Vancouver, located almost 300 km closer than Rupert and with more 
frequent rail connections.  Vancouver was also a port of preference for transportation 
companies. It is closer to the United States, offers lower shipping costs, and more 
developed port infrastructure.  Efforts to further develop the Prince Rupert port relied 
heavily on Federal Government involvement, particularly as ports fell under Federal 
jurisdiction.  And in such an endeavour, both Ottawa and Victoria were reluctant to 
unsettle political support in the Vancouver area in order to pursue development in an 
area where there was limited electoral gain.  This electoral math meant that public 
investment in Rupert offered minimal political returns, particularly when compared with 
the potential gains to be found in Vancouver.  Joseph Scott, then chairman of the Prince 
Rupert Port Authority, explained the predicament in 1981: 
I came by this job honestly.  My grandfather and father were involved 
before me.  I have been directly promoting the Port of Prince Rupert since 
1964, and for ten years before that with the Chamber of Commerce.  
We’ve always had growing pains; not enough tugs, not enough 
longshoremen.  We don’t have enough of everything.  For years, the 
major effort was to move everything through Vancouver.v 
The second factor is the role of Ottawa.  Ports have fallen under the rubric of the Federal 
Government since 1936.  Since Prince Rupert was far removed from the corridors of 
power, there remained little incentive for a strong federal role in investment and 
development.  British Columbia already had a large port in Vancouver, and Ottawa could 
defer to Victoria, which could maintain benign neglect.  An interesting comparison can 
be made with the Port of Churchill, which was developed by the Federal Government in 
the 1930s to help move grain exports.  The port in Churchill is clear of ice only 88 days a 
year, while Rupert is ice free year around.  Still, federal attention and investment was 
encouraged by the provincial government of Manitoba, which had no other port.  
Churchill, for example, had four automated box car dumpers as early as 1931, while 
Rupert received its first automated dumper only in 1974.vi  In fairness to Ottawa, there 
has always been an element of risk involved with Rupert Port development, and so the 
Federal government might be accused of merely playing it safe.  Yet at the same time, it 
was reluctant to cultivate stability to offset risk.  Even a federal endorsement of the 
status quo for a seven year period might have been sufficient to encourage investment 
from private sources.  The lack of such endorsements inhibited private interests from 
investing in Rupert, since any alteration of the existing regulations or shifts in federal 
involvement could seriously jeopardize the potential for earnings.  The Federal 
government was at best ambivalent about Rupert and never created an attractive 
climate to encourage investment or development. 
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Third, the provincial government in Victoria can be accused, not surprisingly, of looking 
after the interests of Vancouver and other ports in the lower mainland ahead of Prince 
Rupert.  One of the more serious obstacles to port development in Prince Rupert was 
the provincially owned British Columbia Railway.  Originally built as the Pacific Great 
Eastern Railway prior to World War I, with track that ran “from nowhere to nowhere” 
within British Columbia, the firm eventually went under and was turned over to the 
provincial government in 1918.  Under provincial direction and investment, track was 
built south to north, eventually connecting Prince George to Vancouver by rail, 
intersecting the former Grand Trunk track and then later extending further into northern 
BC. The Canadian National Railway track that ran west through Prince George to Prince 
Rupert was thus in direct competition with the provincial railway. Inasmuch as BC Rail 
depended on the flow of goods running south to Vancouver, Prince Rupert was left out 
of the loop, and the provincial government faced pressure to maintain the status quo.  By 
one calculation, BC Rail might have lost up to 80% of its freight to Canadian National 
had the port in Rupert developed to rival Vancouver.vii  
Fourth, corporate interests were, by their nature, disparate and diverse.  Crown 
corporations such as BC Rail were interested in maximizing existing investments.  Other 
corporations with interests or concerns connected to Rupert Port development included 
the St. Lawrence Seaway lobby, protecting the interests of ports in the East, and 
Vancouver Wharves, both of which objected to public investment in Rupert.  CN Rail, 
while controlling the track to Rupert, also hoped to maximize their investments in 
Vancouver, and consistently argued that their mandate was to service ports rather than 
develop them.  This same mandate, however, did not limit CN investment in north shore 
terminals in Vancouver. 
Lastly, local government in Prince Rupert had only limited means to foster development.  
The municipality owned no waterfront property, and was dependent on the Federal 
Government to lead the way.  Alternatively, when port expansion did commence, the 
municipality was eager to boost local revenues, and quickly incorporated terminals into 
the city, pushing the tax burden onto the Port and curbing profitability. 
Thus, the existing constellation of interests and resources were largely shaped against 
investment and development, and these factors explain in part why Prince Rupert Port 
development has waited so long for success.  The key missing ingredient was that of 
leadership.  Expectations for government leadership were not illegitimate, since Ottawa 
and Victoria owned the port lands necessary for development. This constellation of 
interests realigned positively during a brief period of intense investment and construction 
beginning in the late 1970s.  With rising grain and coal exports to China and Japan, the 
Vancouver Port became increasingly congested.  Two large projects followed: the 
construction of a new grain terminal, and the construction of a coal terminal, both on 
Ridley Island.  While the two projects developed co-terminously, the stories behind each 
differ radically. 
Eastern grain terminals continued to possess larger storage capacity, unimpressed by 
efforts to move grain through British Columbia.  Up to 40% of Canada’s grain exports to 
China, for example, still moved through eastern ports in 1975, even though studies in the 
1970s had demonstrated less expensive shipping costs through the West Coast.viii  The 
rationale for this large volume through the East recognized that the infrastructure along 
the Great Lakes and St Lawrence could handle large volume, and also recognized, more 
critically, that the Vancouver Port was jammed up.  With small storage capacity, and 
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continuing labour disputes, the Vancouver Port proved unable to satisfy demand for the 
transportation of grain.  Ships would wait at anchor, collecting demurrage costs, waiting 
for grain in Vancouver.  In the meantime, the small Rupert terminals were full of grain but 
had no ships to carry it away.ix  The (federal) Hall Commission on grain handling and 
transportation (1977) recommended, among other things, further development of the 
Rupert Port.x  The costs of lost grain sales were then estimated at $650 million each 
year, and China increasingly began to purchase grain from competitors in Australia and 
elsewhere.xi 
The push behind the construction of a new grain terminal in Rupert, however, was more 
than a consequence of this change in market conditions.  The most interesting alteration 
in the constellation of interests in the 1970s was the emergence of the provincial 
government of neighbouring Alberta.  The Alberta economy in the 1970s had been 
fuelled by rising oil revenues and commodity prices.  Flush with cash and with a Heritage 
Trust Fund started in 1976, Alberta sought to invest in projects of relevance to the 
provincial economy.  Since grain exports were hindered by the lack of developed 
infrastructure, it was the provincial government of Alberta that pushed for, and helped 
finance, the construction of a new grain terminal in Prince Rupert.  Ostensibly under the 
framework of a consortium of six Western grain dealers, the project gained financial 
credibility when it was backed by the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund.xii  Some 
members of the consortium were uncomfortable backing development in Prince Rupert, 
preferring instead the status quo dominated by ports in Vancouver and Thunder Bay. At 
this early stage, poor stereotypes of the Rupert port were prevalent: stake holders 
thought the port froze over in the winter months and the rail connections suffered from 
steep grades.  In reality the railway grades were less steep than the routes to 
Vancouver, and the port was ice free. The provincial government of Alberta assumed the 
dominant leadership role in 1979 and threatened to pursue other options if the grain 
companies did not back the Rupert port.  Backed by Alberta money – up to 80% of the 
costs of the eventual $277 million investment were guaranteed by the province – the 
grain terminal went ahead, completed in 1984.xiii 
Alberta’s leadership in the Rupert port development would seem counterintuitive in 
Canadian federalism.  One would naturally look to the federal government in Ottawa, or 
to the provincial government in Victoria to have played such a dominant role.  Yet, as 
reporter Thomas Kennedy described at the time of the initiative, “Alberta has long 
regarded Prince Rupert as its natural outlet to the sea and subsequently to world 
markets for its grain, coal, and other minerals and products.”xiv  From Alberta’s 
perspective, such investment was common sense.  Alberta Transport Minister noted that 
moving grain through Rupert would bring a net gain of 25 cents per bushel (a total of $25 
million annually), allow greater volumes of export, and provide better control over hopper 
cars. 
Compared to the grain terminal, the construction of a coal terminal in Prince Rupert was 
far more problematic. In the early 1970s, the world demand for coal escalated, largely 
fuelled by growth in the Japanese steel industry.  Problems of congestion with 
Vancouver area ports emerged, and both Japan and those corporations invested in 
coalmines in northeast BC pushed for the development of a coal terminal in Prince 
Rupert.  Hicks has chronicled the “machinations, poisoned atmosphere, needless delays 
and inflated costs” associated with the Rupert coal terminal. At issue was a reactive role 
played by Ottawa and the National Harbours Board, which hindered development in 
order to safeguard their influence.  Further complicating matters was the provincial 
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government’s continued priority to move coal through Vancouver ports.  Both the 
provincial NDP government and BC Rail backed such a policy.  It was not until the Social 
Credit government of Bill Bennett was elected in 1975 that the decision was made to 
develop a new coal terminal in Prince Rupert.  The initial costs were then estimated 
between 50 and 60 million dollars.xv 
Without active federal participation, the implementation of this decision proved 
exceptionally difficult.  It took eight years before the Ridley Island Coal Terminal was 
operational, taking almost twice as long to build as the grain terminal.  In the meantime, 
construction costs escalated to well over $200 million dollars, and the world demand in 
coal had diminished considerably.  Delays were partially the result of disagreements 
between federal and provincial government over the location of the terminal.  The federal 
government expected construction on Ridley Island, which fell under the purview of the 
National Harbours Board.  The provincial government desired construction on Kaien 
Island, which was owned by the BC Development Corporation.  Corporate involvement 
expected to secure guarantees for their investment, and “distrust and suspicion plagued 
the negotiations.”xvi  BC Rail and CN Rail each invested extensively in new track and 
improvements in expectation of the Rupert terminal.  In the end, the agreement behind 
the coal terminal was a sweetheart deal that favoured Montreal based FedNav, a private 
corporation with strong political ties to the Federal Government.  FedNav ended up 
investing only 10% of the costs yet secured an agreement that promised 70% of the 
profits.  The Federal Government carried all the risk and was obligated to buy out 
FedNav in 1991 with compound interest on the investment should FedNav so decide. 
This agreement was reached only in 1981, after the grain terminal had been approved 
and reflected Ottawa’s preoccupation with interests other than Prince Rupert or Western 
transportation needs. 
Neither of these terminals can be considered a financial success.  While the volume of 
annual grain exports through the Prince Rupert Port quadrupled during the first decade 
after the construction of the grain terminal, Rupert never moved more than 29% of the 
total volume of West Coast grain exports.xvii  More importantly, grain exports diminished 
considerably by the late 1990s, influenced by world wide grain production and shifts in 
market demands.  While “Alberta’s port” is a success story in terms of getting the grain 
terminal built, the actual success of the port was also hindered by high debt costs and 
high municipal taxes.  Alberta had financed the project as an investment in infrastructure 
vital to Alberta’s agricultural exports, part of a province building mentality that crossed 
provincial borders. 
The fortunes of the coal terminal were even less successful.  Although the Ridley 
Terminal averaged more than 6 million tonnes of coal annually for the first 15 years, this 
amount was only half of the original, optimistic targets.  More critically, the market price 
of coal had fallen sharply and profitability was entirely absent.  FedNav sold out to the 
Federal Government in 1991, making a tidy profit on its minimal investment.  By the 
early part of this century, exports had fallen to only 1.5 million tonnes a year, and the 
Federal Government was willing to almost give away a perceived albatross, the coal 
terminal.  Since then, coal prices have risen and throughput has increased towards 
profitability.  But at its genesis, Ridley Coal terminal was more a product of 
uncooperative, grudging multi level governance, with the Federal Government 
vulnerable to private interests. 
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Conclusion 
Thus, by 2000, Prince Rupert appeared to have missed again any opportunity to fulfill 
the vision of Charles Hays.  The enthusiasm of the late 1970s and early 1980s had led 
to the construction of two large terminals, but neither were profitable.  Other initiatives, to 
construct a liquid natural gas terminal and an oil pipeline, had also fizzled with the 
collapse of the oil and gas market.  With the fishing industry also diminished, Rupert’s 
prospects were bleak.  Despite the bleak picture, within the next decade a new container 
terminal had revitalized the local economy and the whole Port.  What happened? 
First, as Michael C. Ircha has pointed out in another article of this journal, the container 
industry and Chinese exports have both fuelled increased demand for ports.  Prince 
Rupert has natural geographic advantages that can help address the need for more 
deep water port access on the West Coast.   
Second, the opening of the Fairview Container Port seemed to coincide with a spike in 
economic growth in Alberta, the new überprovince of Canada.  Indeed, Alberta Premier 
Ed Stelmach stated in March 2007 that Rupert was a key component of plans to 
establish Edmonton as an inland port: ``Our government sees the Port of Prince Rupert 
as offering a new and extremely effective route for container traffic… With the expansion 
of the Port, we can establish Alberta as an important inland terminal and distribution 
hub.”xviii  Given the history, one might expect that the two developments are related, 
that Alberta’s economic clout has translated again into infrastructure development 
outside the province, part of Alberta’s drang nach Westen.xix  Edmonton’s mayor 
suggested such a link, resurrecting the old moniker of Alberta’s port.  “The new port will 
bring two continents closer together and open up all kinds of new markets.  Some 
people are already calling it the Port of Alberta.”xx 
Yet the source of Rupert’s resurgence is not only a consequence of Chinese exports or 
Alberta’s oil revenues.  It is very much a consequence of effective multi level 
governance.  The Port of Prince Rupert is part of an overall federal and provincial 
strategy to develop a Pacific Gateway that will benefit all of Canada.  Although much of 
this strategy has focussed on Vancouver (again), it is now much more clearly 
understood that Rupert can be an important part of an effective transportation route to 
the Pacific, particularly in light of environmental concerns and transportation congestion 
in the lower mainland.  Federal and provincial leadership has been evident in the 
development of the Fairview Container Port.  Ottawa contributed $30 million to the 
container port and has since attempted to lighten restrictions on Ports to pursue 
financing for further development.  The Province of British Columbia also contributed a 
similar amount, and, perhaps more importantly, agreed to lease BC Rail to CN Rail in 
order to curb competition between the two railways.  This agreement encouraged 
Canadian National to buy in to the Rupert Port development with additional investments.  
The agreement also was strengthened by Maher International to fund $60 million of the 
Fairview Container Port.xxi  Compared to the grain terminal 25 years ago, Alberta has 
been a minor player in Rupert’s resurgence.  Yes, Alberta may experience significant 
gains as a result of Rupert’s development.  But to call it Alberta’s port is to focus on the 
past rather than the present. 
The Port of Prince Rupert thus reflects the success of “networked federalism,” which can 
draw from a variety of public and private interests, at local, provincial and federal levels 
to pursue common interests and strategies.xxii A consortium of cities and towns along 
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the East-West corridor has been supportive of the Rupert Port development.  The new 
enthusiasm is at least partially infectious:  total tonnage throughput has increased by 
237% between 2005 and 2007.  A new Potash terminal is planned, supported by 
Saskatchewan interests.  Phase Two expansion to the container port gathers financial 
support.  Perhaps Charles Hays really was a visionary.  It only required a network of 
various governments and private interests acting in concert to bring it about. 
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